The Bali roadmap for global climate policy : new horizons and old pitfalls by Watanabe, Rie et al.


Rie Watanabe, Christof Arens, Florian Mersmann,  
Hermann E. Ott, Wolfgang Sterk  
 
The Bali Roadmap for Global Climate 
Policy 
New Horizons and Old Pitfalls 

Pre-submission draft of: 
Rie Watanabe, Christof Arens, Florian Mersmann, Hermann E. Ott, Wolfgang Sterk 
(2008):  
The Bali Roadmap for Global Climate Policy – New Horizons and Old Pitfalls 
In: Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law, 5, 2, 139-158 
 
DOI: 10.1163/161372708X324169 
* This text will be published with small changes by the Journal of European Environmental & Planning Law 
(JEEPL), JEEPL 5.2 (2008), pp.139-158. With the kind permission of the publisher, the pre-editorial text is 
published as a Working Paper of the Wuppertal Institute. 
** All authors contributed equally to the text. 
The Bali Roadmap for Global Climate Policy – New 
Horizons and Old Pitfalls* 
 
By Rie Watanabe, Christof Arens, Florian Mersmann, Hermann E. Ott and 
Wolfgang Sterk ** 
 
1. Introduction  
The international climate negotiations have seen endless conflicts among 
countries from South and North anxiously trying to safeguard what they defined 
as their national interest. Thus the conflict between developed and developing 
countries about who should take action, when, and how much has defined the 
international climate regime from the outset. This division has, moreover, 
hampered progress on achieving protection of the global climate - even more than 
the large transatlantic gap in perception and action concerning climate change. 
The year 2007 could mark the beginning of a rapprochement, most notably 
evidenced in the 13th meeting of the Conference of the Parties and the 3rd meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (COP 13 / CMP 3) held in Bali in December 2007. The conference might 
even be remembered as a watershed in the history of the climate negotiations - not 
because the Bali conference paved the way for the post-2012 negotiations or 
because it was bigger than any meeting before, although the almost 11.000 
participants that attended COP 13 / CMP 3 certainly established a new record.  
The real importance of Bali lies in the fact that many old battlegrounds have been 
vanquished and that a realignment of forces and positions had taken place when 
the longest diplomatic battle in the history of the climate negotiations finally came 
to a close at 6.27 pm on Saturday, 15 December 2007, one full day behind 
schedule. The Bali conference evidenced a remarkable change of strategy by the 
developing countries, in particular the emerging economies. They showed an 
unprecedented dedication to fighting climate change and established themselves 
as forceful players. They thus managed to break up old and destructive features of 
climate policy, despite the continuous counter-action of some industrialised and 
developing countries. 
This article will explore the outcomes of the Bali climate conference in some 
more detail than was previously possible.1 By doing so, we make the assumption 
that the Bali roadmap indeed opens up new horizons for international climate 
                                                
1  Parts of the overall analysis have been previously published. H.E.Ott, W.Sterk & R. Watanabe, The Bali 
roadmap: new horizons for global climate policy, Climate Policy 8 (2008) p. 91-95. The authors are 
grateful for the permission to use part of their analysis for this article. 
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policy, but that the road ahead is full of pitfalls, devious terrain and that some of 
the possible routes may actually turn out to be cul-de-sacs.  
One note of caution should be added: The climate regime has by now become 
rather complex, especially because there is a plethora of negotiation arenas 
created under the two treaties, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. We will deal 
with the issues according to their substance and irrespective of the forum where 
they are negotiated, but will identify the respective fora in order to create clarity. 
2. The Post-2012 Process on Future Commitments 
The post-2012 negotiations have so far run along two tracks: first, at CMP 1 in 
Montreal the parties to the Kyoto Protocol had established an Ad-hoc Working 
Group on further commitments for Annex I-Parties pursuant to Article 3.9 of the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). Second, the Parties to the FCCC in Montreal had 
launched a “dialogue” under the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
the hope of integrating large developing countries and the United States, who 
have refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in constructive discussions on the future 
of the climate regime. The “dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address 
climate change by enhancing implementation of the convention” was not 
supposed to prejudice “any future negotiations, commitments, process, framework 
or mandate under the Convention” and was “an open and non-binding exchange 
of views […] and will not open to any negotiations leading to new 
commitments.”2 
2.1. The Bali Action Plan 
 
The “Bali Action Plan”, adopted in the final plenary, establishes an “Ad-hoc 
working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention” (AWG-
LCA).3 The informal “dialogue” has thus been transformed into a negotiating 
body with a clear mandate: AWG-LCA will work in parallel with the already 
existing working groups under the Kyoto Protocol, in order to strike a 
comprehensive deal by COP 15 / CMP 5 in Copenhagen (2009).4 
The most contentious issues under this agenda item were the nature of the process 
to be established, the reference to the long term vision of the negotiations, and the 
commitments by the developing countries and industrialised countries on their 
                                                
2  Decision 1/CP.11, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the Convention, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, 30 March 2006. 
3   Decision-/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), para., 1. 
4  Id., para. 2. 
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mitigation actions. The Bali Action Plan furthermore elaborates on other issues 
that had been identified before as the essential building blocks of a post-2012 
agreement. The issues will be discussed in the respective sections, namely 
enhanced action on financial transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions 
in developing countries (Section IV), enhanced action on technology development 
and transfer (Section V), and reducing emissions from deforestation (Section VI).  
The nature of the new process was decided first. There were three basic options, 
namely (1) establishing an informal group like the “dialogue” established in 
Montreal, (2) initiating a formal negotiation process with the form of a new 
subsidiary body, i.e. a new AWG under the Convention, or (3) establishing a new 
AWG under the Convention and merging it with the AWG-KP in a single track. 
The majority of parties was in favour of the second option, and therefore Parties 
agreed to establish an AWG under the Convention and to formalise the 
negotiations under the UNFCCC but to still separate it from the negotiations 
under the AWG-KP. The AWG-LCA met for the first time from 31 March to 4 
April 2008 in Bangkok and has scheduled three more meetings during 2008. 
More difficult proved to be the reference to the long-term vision that should guide 
the negotiations. Whereas the EU had originally favoured the adoption of a long-
term emission reduction target as the ultimate objective in the AWG-LCA 
mandate, this was opposed by other industrialised countries and by many 
developing countries. An escape route was provided by the proposal to refer to a 
range of emission scenarios presented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC Working Group III, where emission reductions in the range of below 1990 
levels 25-40% by 2020 were considered necessary. The attempts were successful 
in AWG-KP (see below) but were fruitless in this agenda item. Due to resistance 
by the United States (US), Canada, Japan and Russia, the indicative range of 
mitigation commitments by industrialised countries in 2020 was not included in 
the text, but was relegated to a reference in a footnote.5 To rephrase it positively6, 
however, the Bali Action Plan in paragraph 1(a) nevertheless does open up 
negotiations on achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (Art. 2): the 
“…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations … at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system…”. 7 
Regarding commitments, the decision differentiates between those to be 
negotiated for “developed country Parties” and those for “developing country 
Parties” (for the implications see below, Chapter VI). For developed country 
Parties, the decision calls for consideration of “Measurable, reportable and 
                                                
5  This has been called the „historical footnote of climate policy“, cf. U.E. Simonis, Götter und Götzen. Bali – 
die historische Fußnote der Klimapolitik, Freitag 51, 21 Dec. 2008. 
6  J. Morgan, Towards a new global climate deal. An analysis of agreements and politics of the Bali 
negotiations, E3G January 2008, 
       available at www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Bali_Analysis_Morgan_080120.pdf. 
7 Supra note 3, para. 1(a). 
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verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives” while “ensuring the 
comparability of efforts among them.”8 It is true that this language falls back 
behind the language of the Berlin mandate in 1995 that led to the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, it also represents a major deviation from the 
intention of most notably the US to replace Kyoto-style binding absolute targets 
by voluntary pledges.  
For developing countries, the decision calls for “nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.“9 This in the end proved to be the 
“make or break” formulation in the final hours of the conference. If developed 
countries actually deliver on this promise, the Bali Roadmap will open up new 
horizons and the chance to successfully tackle the climate problem.  
2.2. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)  
The AWG-KP negotiations made steady progress in Bali. The negotiation 
atmosphere was very different from CMP 2 in Nairobi. There, the developing 
countries had insisted that industrialised countries take the lead by determining 
their further commitments in the AWG by 2008 before negotiating stronger 
emission reduction activities for developing countries. By contrast, the 
industrialised countries had attempted to put the negotiations on Articles 3.9 (i.e. 
commitments to be taken by industrialised countries) and the Article 9 review of 
the Protocol (see below) into one package with the intention to establish a linkage 
between the negotiations on the future commitments for themselves and 
negotiations on stronger participation by developing countries. In the end, Parties 
had agreed on a work programme but without specifying the deadline and the 
relationship between the AWG-KP and other post-2012 related items.10  
Over the course of 2007, industrialised and developing countries started to 
overcome their differences. Already at the third AWG meeting held in May in 
Bonn, compromise was reached to develop a timetable to complete the AWG’s 
work so as to avoid a gap between the first and second commitment periods of the 
Kyoto Protocol.11 At the fourth AWG meeting at Vienna in August, the G77 and 
China resisted language referring to the ultimate objective of Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC. However, they agreed on referring to the newly published fourth report 
of the IPCC (AR4) Working Group III (WG III) that indicates that global 
                                                
8 Supra note 3, para. 1(b) 
9 Supra note 3, para. 1(b) 
10 Further commitments for Annex I Parties and Programme of Work, Draft Conclusions, 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/L.4, 14 December 2006 
11 Analysis of mitigation potentials and programme of work. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/L.2, 18 May 2007, para. 10. 
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emissions of GHGs need to peak within the next 10 to 15 years and be reduced to 
very low levels, well below half of the level in 2000, by the middle of the twenty-
first century, in order to stabilise their concentration in the atmospheres at the 
lowest levels assessed by the IPCC to date in its scenarios 12 . In return, 
industrialised countries agreed on inserting language that the AR4 WG III report 
also indicates that achieving the lowest stabilisation level assessed by the IPCC to 
date would require Annex I Parties as a group to reduce emissions in the range of 
25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020.13 
Against this positive backdrop, the negotiations in Bali focussed on the 2008 and 
2009 work programme. Besides the timeline and the relationship with other post 
2012 related issues, namely Article 9 and the Bali Action Plan, reference to the 
IPCC AR4 and an indicative range of the mitigation targets of Annex I Parties that 
were already included in the conclusions of the Vienna meeting was brought on 
the table again. 
Regarding the linkage between the AWG and other post-2012 processes, South 
Africa on behalf of the G77 and China, acknowledged the need to avoid 
duplicative work but opposed any formal links to other post-2012 processes. 
Reflecting this view, Parties agreed that the AWG-KP “will coordinate its work 
with, and draw upon relevant results achieved and work under way in, other 
bodies and processes under the Convention, especially its Kyoto Protocol, with a 
view to avoiding duplication“14 and requested the Secretariat to “schedule the 
AWG-KP’s meetings to the greatest extent possible, in conjunction with meetings 
and activities of other relevant processes under the Convention and its Kyoto 
Protocol, with a view to ensuring the efficient use of resources“.15  
 
Regarding the timeline, taking a side glance at the negotiations on the Bali Action 
Plan Parties agreed that the AWG aims to forward relevant decisions on Annex I 
Future Commitments for adoption by CMP5 to be held in 2009,16 same timing 
when the AWG-LCA will complete its work.17 
On the reference to the IPCC AR4 and an indicative range of mitigation 
commitments by Annex I Parties, the draft conclusions distributed in the final 
plenary still contained two options: the first, supported by Canada and the Russian 
Federation, referred only to the relevant paragraph numbers in the report of the 
Vienna session. 18  The second option, supported by the EU, New Zealand, 
                                                
12 Analysis of mitigation potentials and identification of ranges of emission reduction objectives of Annex I 
Parties, FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/L. 4, 31 August 2007, para. 6 
13 Id., para. 7. 
14 Review of work programme, methods of work and schedule of future sessions Draft conclusions proposed 
by the Chair, FCCC/AWG/2007/L.6/Rev.1, 13 December 2007, para. 2 
15 Id., para. 10. 
16 Id., para. 9. 
17 Supra note 4. 
18 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol on the first part of its fourth session, FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/L.3, 30 August 2007. 
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Switzerland, and developing countries, contained the same language as in the 
conclusions of the Vienna session.19 With slight modifications by the Russian 
Federation with the assistance of the EU and South Africa, Parties finally agreed 
on the second option, i.e. a full reference to the need for Annex I Parties as a 
group to reduce emissions in the range of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020.  
2.3. Article 9 Review of the Kyoto Protocol  
 
Article 9 of the Kyoto Protocol prescribes a general review of the adequacy of the 
Protocol at regular intervals, with the first review starting at CMP 2. Along with 
the AWG-KP, the review had been one of the most contentious issues in Nairobi. 
Delegates finally agreed to conclude a brief first review at CMP 2 and to conduct 
the second review at CMP 4 in 2008.  
The scope and content of the second review were considered at CMP 3 in Bali, 
again with diverging positions of industrialised and developing countries. 
Developing countries20 stated that the Kyoto Protocol was still a relatively new 
instrument, having been in force for two years only, and that the second review 
should therefore aim at strengthening its implementation. 21 By contrast, 
industrialised countries22 argued that the Protocol was in fact already 10 years old 
and the available knowledge now far greater. They proposed to undertake a 
thorough review of all aspects of the Protocol, highlighting especially its 
effectiveness to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention. Parties agreed 
that the review “shall aim to enhance the implementation of the Protocol and 
further elaborate upon a number of its elements, in particular adaptation.”23  
Parties also agreed that the review preparations shall take into account results of 
other relevant activities in the post-2012 process in order to avoid duplicated 
work.24 The review itself will be based on the best available science, noting in 
particular the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.25 Regarding the process to 
prepare for the second review at CMP 4, the secretariat will organise a workshop 
and issue a progress report by October 2008. 26 The CMP also invites Parties for 
submission of their views on several outstanding issues, including extending the 
                                                
19 Supra note 12 and 13. 
20 Most notably Pakistan for the G77 and China, seconded in particular by Saudi Arabia and India 
21 in particular of Annex I commitments in the areas of mitigation, adaptation, funding and technology 
transfer, as well as the CDM and non-market sources of funding. 
22 the European Union, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Australia and Norway. 
23  Decision -/CMP.3  Scope and content of the second review of the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 9  
(Advance unedited version), para. 1 
24 Id., para. 4. 
25 Id., para. 2 
26 Id., para. 8 
 7
share of proceeds to JI and emissions trading to Adaptation Fund.27 The agreed 
text reiterates as in the CMP 2 decision that the review will not lead to new 
commitments for any party.28 Considering that such a preparatory process had not 
been undertaken before the first review at CMP 2, however, it is expected that the 
second review will provide a basis for the negotiations on other post 2012 related 
negotiations to be concluded in 2009.  
3.  Flexible Mechanisms  
While the Clean Development Mechanism continues to grow rapidly, in 2007 the 
voices doubting the environmental integrity of the CDM have grown 
considerably. Several studies and news reports had claimed that the CDM 
approval process was failing to effectively screen out projects that are actually not 
additional but would also have taken place without the CDM.29 In Bali, concerns 
about the effectiveness of the project screening process and the workload of the 
CDM Executive Board (EB) prompted Switzerland to propose to undertake an 
assessment of the CDM. Apart from the quality of projects, Switzerland also 
wanted to identify and remove bottlenecks in the CDM process and improve 
transparency. 
The Swiss proposal was at first welcomed by many Parties. However, over the 
course of the negotiations it became apparent that Parties had rather diverging 
views of which content and direction such an assessment should take. It was 
therefore dropped in the end. The CMP requested the EB to finalise the ongoing 
work on a Validation and Verification Manual (VVM) as its highest priority. It is 
also to identify and implement further means to promote the consistency and 
quality of the validation and verification process.30 In addition, while the Swiss 
proposal was not adopted, the implementation and effectiveness of the CDM will 
also be taken up in the framework of the general Article 9 review of the Kyoto 
Protocol (see above). 
The CMP also had a full agenda left over from previous sessions as regards 
controversial project types, namely projects that reduce the unsustainable use of 
biomass, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), HFC-23 and small-scale 
                                                
27 Ukraine supported by the Russian Federation expressed their concerns about the expansion after the 
decision was adopted.   
28 Decision -/CMP.3, para. 3 
29 E.g. A. Michaelowa & P. Purohit, Additionality determination of Indian CDM projects, Can Indian CDM 
project developers outwit the CDM Executive Board? 2007; L. Schneider, Is the CDM fulfilling its 
environmental and sustainable development objective? An evaluation of the CDM and options for 
improvement, 2007. 
30 Decision -/CMP.3, Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/L.3, 11 December, para. 15. 
 8
afforestation and reforestation.31 Progress on these issues was mixed. After years 
of deliberation at the CDM EB and the CMP, CMP 3 finally gave the go-ahead for 
projects reducing the unsustainable use of biomass. 32 The CMP also decided to 
raise the threshold that defines small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects 
from 8,000 t CO2 removal per year to 16,000 t. Through the increase of the 
threshold, more projects will be able to use the simplified rules that apply to 
small-scale projects. 33 By contrast, discussion on CCS and HFC-23 projects once 
again did not make much progress and were postponed to SB 28 in June.34 
In contrast to the full CDM agenda, the Joint Implementation (JI) negotiations 
were again very quiet. The JI Supervisory Committee (JISC) had made the 
mechanism operational in 2006 and is currently mainly working on accrediting 
Independent Entities.  
4. Financial Mechanisms  
4.1. Fourth review of the Financial Mechanisms  
 
Almost at every COP, developing countries have called for an increased transfer 
of financial resources from industrialised countries for engaging in mitigation and 
adaptation actions. The Convention and the Protocol indeed mandate Annex II 
parties35 to provide financial resources to support developing countries in national 
communications development, capacity-building, development and transfer of 
technologies, support for adaptation, support for economic diversification, support 
for mitigation, and so on (Articles 4.3 of the Convention, Article 11 of the 
Protocol). The demand of developing countries for financial resources has never 
been met, however. 
 
                                                
31 For a more detailed explanation of these issues, see W. Sterk, H.E. Ott, R. Watanabe & B. Wittneben, The 
Nairobi Climate Change Summit (COP 12 – MOP2): Taking a Deep Breath before Negotiating Post-2012 
Targets? JEEPL 2007 (2), p. 139, 145 et seq.  
32 Decision -/CMP.3, Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/L.3, 11 December, para. 24. 
33  Decision -/CMP.3, Implications of possible changes to the limit for small-scale afforestation and 
reforestation clean development mechanism project activities, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.18/Add.1, 10 
December.  
34 Carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations as clean development mechanism project 
activities, Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.9, 10 December 2007, 
Methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol, Implications of the establishment of new 
hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) facilities seeking to obtain certified emission reductions for the 
destruction of hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23), Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.13, 8 December 2007.  
35 Annex II Parties is Annex I industrialised Parties minus Economy in Transition countries. 
 9
The COP 13 / SB 27 continued to address the above issues by starting the fourth 
review of the financial mechanisms and receiving the report of, and negotiating on 
guidance to, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).  
The lack of sufficient resources was in particular highlighted in this session due to 
publication of a paper developed by the Secretariat, which reviews existing, 
planned and needed investment and financial flows to address climate change.36 
The paper pointed out the necessity to increase investment and financial flows to 
379.5 billion $ for mitigation activities and several tens of billions for adaptation 
in 2030.37 Considering that the GEF trust fund currently allocates only 1 billion 
US $ to climate change under its fourth replenishment from 2006 to 2010,38 the 
necessity for developing ways to scale up public and private financial flows is 
obvious. Parties agreed to adopt the additional guidelines for the fourth review 
and to submit their views on a series of reports and papers produced by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat and the GEF Secretariat. 39  The SBI will consider the 
submissions by parties at its 28th session and recommend a draft decision for 
adoption by COP 14.40 
Another issue that has received particular attention is the complexity of operation 
of the financial mechanisms. First, G77 and China expressed their concerns about 
a communication gap between the GEF and the parties, which prevented the GEF 
from grasping the needs of developing countries. Addressing this concern, the 
adopted decision requests the GEF to continuously enhance its country dialogues 
and to ensure the transparency and timeliness of its communications with parties 
on changes undertaken in the GEF reform agenda.41 Second, G77 and China 
criticised the complexity resulting from the necessity of calculating “incremental 
cost42” and claimed that it was an obstacle to timely access to GEF funds. The 
                                                
36 UNFCCC, Background paper on analysis of existing and planned investment and financial flows relevant 
to the development of effective and appropriate international response to climate change, 2007, 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.p
df 
37 Id. at 91, 125. 
38 GEF, Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund Replenishment: Revised Draft Resolution for approval by 
the World Bank Executive Directors. GEF/R. 4/34 May 24, 2006. p.3. 
39 Draft decision-/CP.13, Fourth review of the financial mechanism (Advance unedited version), para. 2. The 
technical paper on the review of the experience of international funds, multilateral financial institutions 
and other sources of funding relevant to the current and future investment and financial needs of 
developing countries, the report prepared by the secretariat, in collaboration with the Global Environment 
Facility secretariat, on the assessment of the funding necessary to assist developing countries, in 
accordance with the guidance provided by the Conference of the Parties, in meeting their commitments 
under the Convention cover the next Global Environment Facility replenishment cycle, taking into 
account paragraph 1(a)-(d) of the annex to the memorandum of understanding between the Conference of 
the Parties and the Global Environment Facility Council (decision 12/CP.3), and the report on the 
analysis of existing and potential investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an 
effective and appropriate international response to climate change. 
40 Id., para. 4.  
41 Draft Decision-/CP.13 Additional guidance to the Global Environment Facility (Advance unedited     
      version), para. 1.(a) 
42  The GEF has defined incremental costs as the difference between the full costs of the measures taken and 
the sum of the costs of the least expensive way to deliver an equivalent economic benefit plus the short-
 10
agreed decision requests the GEF to simplify and streamline the application of the 
incremental cost principle, and to improve access to GEF funds for those 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.43  
4.2. Adaptation Fund 
 
The Adaptation Fund (AF) is to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programmes in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change. It will be funded from a 2% levy on the issuance of Certified 
Emission Reductions under the CDM. However, operationalisation of the AF had 
for years been caught up in a wrangle over its institutional arrangements. 
The industrialised countries have always preferred the GEF to manage the fund. 
They maintained that choosing the GEF would ensure that project activities would 
be better coordinated with the other financial mechanisms under the Convention 
whose operational entity is the GEF. By contrast, developing countries questioned 
the legitimacy of the GEF, where donor governments play a dominant role44, to 
handle this fund, as most of the resources for the AF will probably not come from 
donor countries but from the CDM, i.e. mitigation projects in developing 
countries. LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) further feared that 
certain rules of the GEF’s current mandate would lead to the AF favouring 
countries that already receive the bulk of foreign direct investment or Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) flowing to the South.  
In Bali, Parties finally agreed on the institutional arrangements of the AF: they 
decided to establish the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) as an operating entity 
consisting of 16 members, with two representatives from each of the five UN 
regional groups, one from SIDS, one from the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), two others from Annex I parties as well as two representatives of non-
Annex I parties; thus, establishing a majority from developing countries. The AFB 
shall “supervise and manage” the Adaptation Fund under the authority and 
guidance of and be fully accountable to the CMP.45 The Board’s functions 
comprise, inter alia, recommending strategic priorities and policies to the CMP, 
deciding on projects and developing criteria to ensure that entities applying for 
funding have the necessary financial and administrative capacity. The Board is to 
                                                                                                                                 
term benefits to the local economy (baseline) that would result from the proposed measure. GEF, 
Implementing the FCCC, Incremental Costs and the Role of the GEF. Working Paper 4, 1993, p. 31. 
43 Supra note 39, para. 1 (c) 
44 They were particularly concerned about the voting structure of the GEF Council where a double majority is 
required, i.e. an affirmative vote must represent both a 60% majority of the total number of participants 
and a 60% majority of the total contributions. 
45 Decision -/CMP.3, Adaptation Fund (Advance unedited version), paras. 3 and 4.   
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be served by the GEF as a secretariat and the World Bank as a trustee on an 
interim basis.46 These two interim institutional arrangements are to be reviewed at 
CMP 6. In case that there is revision, the decision calls for the CMP to ensure that 
ongoing project activities are not jeopardised.  
 
5. Technology Transfer  
According to Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC and Article 10(c) of the Kyoto Protocol, 
Annex II industrialised countries are committed to promote, facilitate and finance 
the transfer of technology in order to speed up the diffusion of emission reduction 
and adaptation technology. Recent negotiations have focused on the future 
mandate of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), which is 
undertaking analytical work. The mandate of the EGTT expired at COP 12 in 
Nairobi. In Nairobi, developing countries had strongly called for replacing it with 
a new and stronger body, a so-called Technology Transfer and Development 
Board, and also for establishing a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund to 
buy intellectual property rights. These proposals were opposed by industrialised 
countries who instead argued for continuing and strengthening the EGTT. Parties 
were unable to bridge this division and finally decided to extend the mandate of 
EGTT for one year and continue discussions.47 
Originally set in the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA), G77 and China also introduced the issue of Technology Transfer into 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) during the first COP plenary in 
Bali, a move widely unnoticed by other country delegates. Subsequently, two 
separate contact groups under SBSTA and SBI were established to address the 
issue. G77 and China proposed new text for a draft decision under SBI, mainly 
revolving around the implementation of a new and additional multilateral 
technology fund. This was greeted with some reservation by industrialised 
countries.  
After informal consultations over the weekend, no agreement was reached. The 
main conflict between G77 and China and the industrialised countries revolved 
around the scope of a new mechanism regarding Technology Transfer. Whereas 
the developing countries strongly supported a fund, the industrialised countries 
were in favour of a program or facility on technology transfer. In the end, the 
differences were narrowed down to a few words; nevertheless, no agreement 
                                                
46 Id., paras. 19 and 23. 
47 Decision 5/CP.12, Development and transfer of technologies, para. 1, in: Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its twelfth session, held at Nairobi from 6 to 17 November 2006, Addendum, 
FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add. 1, 26 January 2007. 
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could be reached. The SBI therefore concluded to further negotiate the issue at SB 
28 in June. 
Parallel negotiations under SBSTA did not come to a final decision either. 
Developing countries noted the postponement of the SBI and SBSTA negotiations 
with deep concern, emphasizing that technology transfer in their eyes was one of 
the major issues at this COP and could well be a stumbling stone for the whole 
post-2012 negotiation process.  
Given the importance of the issue for the post-2012 negotiations, COP president 
Witoelar decided to reopen the issue in the COP plenary. After lengthy 
negotiations, the Parties agreed on adopting the COP decision regarding SBSTA 
to extend the mandate of the EGTT another five years48; they further adopted a set 
of actions.49 The SBI decision states, inter alia, that the EGTT shall recommend 
actions to both SBs. Funding priorities are identified and a request is made to the 
GEF to devise a Strategic Programme to increase investment in technology 
transfer.50 The COP in its conclusions requested the Secretariat to devise a 
regional training programme with successive workshops in 2008 and 2009, an 
adaptation technology meeting and a prompt meeting of the EGTT.51 
 
6. Deforestation  
Deforestation accounts for about a fifth of all global greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol had so far addressed this 
issue in an appropriate manner. At COP 11 in Montreal, Papua New Guinea, 
Costa Rica and eight other Parties called for the COP to consider allowing carbon 
credits for deforestation efforts. In 2006, Brazil tabled a competing proposal 
according to which countries would not get credits for reducing deforestation but 
payments from an international fund supported by donor country contributions.  
In the meantime labelled ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries’ (REDD), in Bali the agenda item saw 
heated discussions on the form of possible incentives, on how to refer to pilot 
projects, and on the question whether forest conservation should be included in 
the decision. The latter was advocated mainly by India. Including forest 
conservation in REDD would have meant rewarding Parties for efforts to stop 
                                                
48 Decision  -/CP.13,  Development and transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, (Advance unedited version), para. 3. 
49 Id., para.,2. 
50 Decision /CP.13,  Development and transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(Advance unedited version), para. 3. 
51 Development and transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice, Draft Conclusions proposed by the President. FCCC/CP/2007/L.3, 13 December 2007, paras. 2a 
and d. 
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deforestation in the past, thus probably taking away resources from future 
reduction efforts. Parties finally reached a consensus on this issue with India 
accepting a compromise text, leaving the conservation issue for “further 
consideration”. Another controversial issue was how to refer to deforestation in 
the context of long-term cooperative action under the Convention. The US tried to 
link the REDD decision to the broader term ”land use” in general. This would 
have taken away the focus from current deforestation and opened up the 
mechanism to, for example, issues of forestry in Annex I countries. The US, in 
contrast to India, insisted on its demand until the very last minute – it was only in 
the final plenary session on Saturday that the US finally agreed to leave out this 
reference the developing countries had opposed so strongly. 
The final decision on REDD encourages parties to undertake “demonstration 
activities” to address the drivers of deforestation, supported by “indicative 
guidance” provided in an annex to the decision. 52  Moreover, the decision 
establishes a 2-years-process under SBSTA on methodological issues related to 
policy approaches and positive incentives. 53  Whether incentives to reduce 
deforestation should include direct financing for REDD activities or issuing 
emission credits is left open in the decision: this question is to be dealt with in the 
new AWG-LCA. 
The REDD decision is an important step forward, as developing countries for the 
first time agreed to contribute to reducing emissions and protecting forests. 
Several developed countries announced or had announced even prior to the 
decision substantial contributions for supporting the demonstration activities. The 
Norwegian Government, for example, had granted US $ 545 million per year in 
the period 2008-2012 as early as December 9, thus stressing the developed 
countries’ will to support the tropical forest countries in their efforts.  
 
7. Conclusions and Ways Forward  
 
The assumption posited in the introduction appears to be confirmed after some 
examination of the conference results - that the Bali Conference was one of the 
more successful conferences in the history of the climate negotiations and may 
even haven opened up new horizons. The Bali Roadmap provides a real chance 
that the pre-Copenhagen negotiations will result in an effective and workable 
post-2012 agreement. After 17 years of conflicts since the initiation of 
negotiations by the International Negotiation Committee (INC), the Parties finally 
agreed to negotiate an agreement with the understanding that all major emitters 
will take on some kind of mitigation activities. The Bali conference also saw a 
                                                
52 Decision -/CP.13, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate 
action (Advance unedited version), paras. 3 and 4. 
53 Id., para. 7 
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significant shift in the battle lines, a rearrangement of positions and alliances that 
might well announce a decisive new era in global climate policy. 
One of the main factors to bring about this success was a change of strategy by 
developing countries. Under the traditional strategy, as evidenced in the AWG-KP 
and Article 9 negotiations up to Nairobi, developing countries had insisted that 
Annex I-Parties should take the lead. In Bali, developing countries showed an 
unprecedented willingness to take up an active role in the fight against climate 
change. One after the other, the large emerging economies took the floor to 
announce that they were willing to do more, to contribute their fair share to the 
fight against climate change. Bali thus effectively annihilated the main excuse of 
the industrialised countries for not taking further commitments, namely that 
developing countries are unwilling to make contributions.  
The change of strategy was supported by the emergence of new actors on the 
climate stage. The Bali conference saw many new faces from finance and 
technology areas and, most notably, from the social justice movements. This has 
two reasons: first of all, social activists all over the world have realised that 
climate change threatens social progress and fundamentally interferes with 
peoples’ rights all over the planet. And, second, many of the solutions affect the 
South and poor people in the South especially, like the hype for agrofuels that is 
leading to widespread deforestation in Indonesia, Amazonia and elsewhere. The 
CDM has taken proportions where it is having a measurable impact in developing 
countries - and much of it not in a positive direction. And the sheer volume of the 
financial resources required - in the range of hundreds of billion Euros per year - 
will dwarf the traditional flows in official development aid. Bali thus saw the 
coming-out of the social justice movement on the issue of climate change. 
Organisations like Oxfam, Christian Aid, the Third World Network and Focus on 
the Global South are taking the issue of climate change very seriously. Their 
engagement has not only changed the content of the negotiations because of their 
emphasis on social justice and equity, it has also increased the confidence of 
developing countries. 
This new confidence has led to a Bali Action Plan that provides developing 
countries with a clearly worded anchor for financial and technological support, 
strengthening the formulations already embodied in the UNFCCC (Articles 4.3 
and 4.5). Any substantive commitments on their part will have to be matched by 
“measurable, reportable and verifiable” support from developed countries. 
Moving the words “measurable, reportable and verifiable” away from developing 
countries’ mitigation actions to the technological and financial support testifies to 
the enhanced importance of the emerging economies in the climate negotiations. It 
should be noted, however, that also the mitigation actions themselves have to be 
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“measurable, reportable and verifiable” - this was clarified by an intervention of 
South Africa in the final hours of the negotiations.54 
The decision furthermore indicates a willingness on the part of developing 
countries to engage in differentiation, because it moves away from the historical 
division between “Annex I” and “non-Annex I” countries. There has been an 
increasing differentiation within the G77 where booming economies in Asia and 
Latin America have little in common with many least developed countries. Using 
the terms “developed country Parties” and “developing country Parties”, this 
decision opens the door for new combinations and grades of commitments for 
developing countries. The post-2012 negotiations can thus take into account the 
different stages of economic development, emissions and mitigation potential in 
which developing countries find themselves.55 Developing appropriate indicators 
and ways for differentiation between developing countries will be one of the most 
difficult tasks of the two years ahead. 
It will be equally difficult and important to develop mechanisms for financing 
mitigation in developing countries and for technology cooperation. Initially 
considered to be quite a low-key part of the deal by the industrialised countries, 
G77 and China managed to raise these issues to become one of the major building 
blocks of the Bali package. The coming negotiations on technology cooperation 
and financial mechanisms must address these issues in order to fully meet the 
demands of developing countries and enhance the chances for a post-2012 
agreement. Of vital importance are: simplification of the financial mechanisms’ 
operation, the establishment of new mechanisms of technology transfer, and 
scaling up of funding. The EU, which at first seemed to be highly reluctant to 
agree to yet another funding mechanism, in the end merged its proposal with G77 
and China’s to a comprehensive package that will now have to prove itself in the 
negotiation process in the next two years.  
Especially crucial for the future South-North relationship (and therefore the fate 
of the climate negotiations) will be the smooth operation of the Adaptation Fund. 
The agreement on this fund was the last outstanding item in order to completely 
implement the Kyoto Protocol and the fund’s adoption came right on time, given 
that the Protocol’s first commitment period was to begin only two weeks later. 
However, the several hundred millions of dollars the fund is expected to generate 
                                                
54  See also B. Mueller, Bali 2007: On the road again! Impressions from the Thirteenth UN Climate Change 
Conference; available at www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/mueller.html. 
55 See e.g. Ott, H.E., Winkler, H., Brouns, B., Kartha, S., Mace, M.J., Huq, S., Kameyama, Y., Sari, A.P., Pan, 
J., Sokona, Y., Bhandari, P.M., Kassenberg, A., La Rovere, E.L. & Rahman, A., South-North Dialogue on 
Equity in the Greenhouse. A proposal for an adequate and equitable global climate agreement; GTZ 
Climate Protection Programme, May 2004, available at 
http://www.wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wiprojekt/1085_proposal.pdf; see also the concept of Greenhouse 
Development Rights by Ecoequity at www.ecoequity.org/docs/TheGDRsFramework.pdf. 
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can only be a first start for adaptation funding in view of the several billions of 
dollars estimated to be necessary for adaptation.56 
The CDM is also an important cornerstone in South-North relations. It has already 
mobilised significantly more funding and investments than the financial 
mechanisms, but there are serious concerns about the current structure and 
functioning of the CDM. A growing number of studies and reports indicate that a 
large number of projects is actually not additional, significantly impairing the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. And even at best the CDM 
will only off-set Annex I emissions. The Article 9 review should therefore take a 
close look at the functioning of the CDM. First, a post-2012 CDM should move 
beyond offsetting and yield real net reductions in global emissions as well as real 
benefits for sustainable development. Second, Parties should explore to shift from 
the project-by-project approach to more top-down approaches, variously 
discussed as policy-based CDM, sectoral CDM, or no-lose targets. Sectoral 
approaches to the CDM also entail some new risks, though, in particular as 
regards the feasibility of adequately quantifying emissions and reductions at the 
sectoral level.57 If the project-based CDM is retained instead of or alongside 
sectoral approaches, additionality testing would have to be severely strengthened. 
The above explanation illustrates that there were a number of positive aspects but 
that the challenges on the bumpy road from Bali to Copenhagen are enormous. 
Quite obvious is the enormous workload - from negotiating deepened 
commitments for those countries that are already bound under the Kyoto Protocol, 
new commitments for developing countries (including methods for 
differentiation), integrating the US with new commitments, adaptation, 
deforestation, financial mechanisms, technology cooperation, transfer 
mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation to improving the market mechanisms 
that are still in the first stages of their existence. All these processes have to be 
kept under surveillance, kept apart, streamlined where necessary and – in the end 
– all those different threads have to be combined into one gigantic package deal. 
As if the issues themselves were not complex enough already, these negotiations 
will take place on six different stages: the COP and the CMP of convention and 
protocol, the two subsidiary bodies and the ad-hoc working groups under the 
convention and the protocol. The AWG-LCA initiated by the Bali Action Plan has 
scheduled four sessions for 2008, the first session already took place in April 
2008. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) according to its work plan adopted in Bali 
will also hold four meetings in 2008 and 2009 respectively. If the utter exhaustion 
of even several “veterans” of the diplomatic circus during the final hours of the 
                                                
56 Supra note 37 
57 W. Sterk & B. Wittneben, Enhancing the clean development mechanism through sectoral 
approaches: definitions, applications and ways forward, IEA 2006 (3), p. 271. 
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Bali conference is not to become a common sight in these negotiations, the 
participants will have to find ways of accommodating their capacities to these 
demands.  
Another challenge that the negotiators will not be able to influence at all is the 
elections in the United States. It is far from certain that the US after the elections 
will play the role that its economic and political power seems to dictate. A new 
president may be able to enact new legislation against global warming, however, 
ratification of a post-2012 agreement by Congress may prove to be impossible. If 
that is the case, international law provides an alternative: the next US government 
could establish a strong national climate programme in the US, including 
ambitious reduction targets, and declare unilaterally that the US considers itself 
bound to this target by international law. There is a small chance that such a 
binding international declaration under international law could politically satisfy 
the rest of the world. 
The most difficult diplomatic task, however, is one that every government has an 
influence on: forging an alliance between North and South will be the key to 
successful negotiations. This alliance must support the emerging economies on 
mitigation and the poorer countries on adaptation. There are convincing motives 
for such an alliance, because the threat of a destabilization of the climate system 
can only be solved by a truly global effort: fifty percent of emissions stem from 
Annex I and fifty percent from non-Annex I countries, rising rapidly. Each side 
thus has the potential to lead the world into climate chaos if it continues a course 
of business-as-usual – some new form of “mutually assured destruction”, as the 
nuclear confrontation was called in the cold war. Substantial contributions from 
the South will require equally substantial financial and non-financial support from 
the North. The Bali coalition between developing countries and the EU opens up 
new horizons and provides some reason for optimism that such an alliance is 
possible. 
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